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India’s and Pakistan’s
nuclear tests of May 1998 put to rest years of speculation as to whether the two
countries, long suspected of developing covert weapons capabilities, would
openly exercise their so-called nuclear option. The dust had hardly settled
from the tests, however, when a ªrestorm of debate erupted over nuclear
weapons’ regional security implications. Some observers argued that nucleari-
zation would stabilize South Asia by making Indo-Pakistani conºict prohibi-
tively risky. Others maintained that, given India and Pakistan’s bitter historical
rivalry, as well as the possibility of accident and miscalculation, proliferation
would make the subcontinent more dangerous.1 The tenth anniversary of the
tests offers scholars an opportunity to revisit this issue with the beneªt of a
decade of hindsight. What lessons do the intervening years hold regarding nu-
clear weapons’ impact on South Asian security?
Proliferation optimists claim that nuclear weapons had a beneªcial effect
during this period, helping to stabilize India and Pakistan’s historically vola-
tile relations. Sumit Ganguly and Devin Hagerty, for example, argue that in
recent years “the Indian and Pakistani governments, despite compelling incen-
tives to attack one another . . . were dissuaded from doing so by fear that war
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might escalate to the nuclear level.”2 It is true that since 1998 South Asian mili-
tarized disputes have not reached the point of nuclear confrontation or full-
scale conventional conºict.3 Nonetheless, I argue that optimistic analyses of
proliferation’s regional security impact are mistaken. Nuclear weapons had
two destabilizing effects on the South Asian security environment. First, nu-
clear weapons’ ability to shield Pakistan against all-out Indian retaliation, and
to attract international attention to Pakistan’s dispute with India, encouraged
aggressive Pakistani behavior. This provoked forceful Indian responses, rang-
ing from large-scale mobilization to limited war.4 Although the resulting Indo-
Pakistani crises did not lead to nuclear or full-scale conventional conºict, such
fortunate outcomes were not guaranteed and did not result primarily from nu-
clear deterrence. Second, these crises have triggered aggressive changes in
India’s conventional military posture. Such developments may lead to future
regional instability.
Below, I examine three phases of Indo-Pakistani relations since the nuclear
tests. First, I discuss the period 1998 to 2002. I show that during these years
Indo-Pakistani tensions reached levels unseen since the early 1970s, resulting
in the 1999 Kargil war as well as a major militarized standoff that stretched
from 2001 to 2002. An examination of this period reveals that nuclear weapons
facilitated Pakistan’s adoption of the low-intensity conºict strategy that
triggered these confrontations, and that the crises’ eventual resolution resulted
primarily from nonnuclear factors such as diplomatic calculations and conven-
tional military constraints. In the article’s next section I examine the years 2002
to 2008. I argue that although Indo-Pakistani relations became more stable dur-
ing this period, the improvements were modest and had little to do with nu-
clear weapons. Instead, they resulted mainly from changes in the international
strategic environment, shifting domestic priorities, and nonnuclear security
calculations. In addition, this period saw the emergence of strategic trends that
could eventually undermine South Asian security. In the article’s subsequent
section, I discuss these developments’ likely impact on future regional stabil-
ity. I show that past Indo-Pakistani conºict led the Indians to begin formulat-
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rent: Pokhran II and Beyond (New Delhi: Har-Anand, 1999), pp. 150–188.
2. Sumit Ganguly and Devin T. Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry: India-Pakistan Crises in the Shadow of Nu-
clear Weapons (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2005), p. 9.
3. By “full-scale” conventional conºict, I mean a conºict that involves states’ regular militaries,
crosses ofªcial international boundaries, and is great enough to threaten the loser with cata-
strophic defeat.
4. By “limited” war, I mean a conºict resulting in at least 1,000 battle deaths that involves guerril-
ing a more aggressive conventional military doctrine. This could increase
Indo-Pakistani security competition and result in rapid escalation in the event
of an actual conºict. Thus nuclear weapons not only destabilized South Asia in
the aftermath of the nuclear tests; they may damage the regional security envi-
ronment in the years to come. In the article’s ªnal section, I discuss the impli-
cations of my argument.
Nuclear Weapons in South Asia, 1998 to 2002
In 1998 India and Pakistan were enjoying a period of relative stability that had
begun in the early 1970s. These years were not wholly tranquil, having been
punctuated by periods of considerable tension. For example, a serious dis-
agreement had arisen between the two countries during the mid-1980s over
Pakistani support for a Sikh separatist movement in the Indian Punjab.5 Also,
since 1989 India and Pakistan had been at loggerheads over Pakistan’s backing
of a bloody insurgency in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir.6 Nonethe-
less, the two countries had not fought a war with each other since 1972. This
was the longest period without an Indo-Pakistani war since the two countries
gained independence from Great Britain in 1947.7 Less than a year after the
1998 nuclear tests, however, India and Pakistan were embroiled in their ªrst
war in twenty-eight years.
In late 1998, Pakistan Army forces, disguised as local militants, crossed the
Line of Control (LoC) dividing Indian from Pakistani Kashmir and seized posi-
tions up to 12 kilometers inside Indian territory. The move threatened Indian
lines of communication into northern Kashmir. After discovering the incursion
in May 1999, India launched a spirited air and ground offensive to oust the in-
truders. The operation was characterized by intense, close-quarters combat,
with Indian infantry and artillery ejecting the Pakistanis from the mountain-
ous terrain peak by peak. Although expanding the war could have facilitated
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5. On the Sikh insurgency, see Paul Wallace, “Political Violence and Terrorism in India: The Crisis
of Identity,” in Martha Crenshaw, ed., Terrorism in Context (University Park: Penn State University
Press, 1995), pp. 352–409.
6. See Sumit Ganguly, The Crisis in Kashmir: Portents of War, Hopes of Peace (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1997); and Sumantra Bose, Kashmir: Roots of Conºict, Paths to Peace (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003).
7. In the twenty-ªve-year period between independence and the end of the Bangladesh conºict,
India and Pakistan fought three wars: in 1948, 1965, and 1971.
their task, the Indians did not cross the LoC, restricting their operations to the
Indian side of the boundary. The Pakistanis ªnally withdrew in mid-July, after
Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif traveled to Washington and signed a U.S.-
prepared agreement to restore the LoC. More than 1,000 Indian and Pakistani
forces died in the Kargil ªghting.8
What impact did nuclear weapons have on the outbreak of the Kargil
conºict? The roots of the Kargil operation date back to the late 1980s, when
Pakistan was beginning to acquire a nuclear capacity.9 Pakistani leaders, long
unhappy with the division of Kashmir, had launched two wars for the terri-
tory, one in 1948 and another in 1965. Although neither effort was successful,
in both cases the Pakistanis managed to ªght the Indians to a stalemate.
But Pakistan’s 1971 defeat in the Bangladesh war, in which India severed East
Pakistan from its Western wing, demonstrated that the Pakistanis could no
longer confront India without risking catastrophic defeat. After 1971 Pakistan
thus stopped challenging India for control of Kashmir.
By the late 1980s, however, Pakistan’s strategic situation had changed, en-
abling it once more to attempt to undermine the Kashmiri status quo. This
change resulted from several factors. First, the Kashmir insurgency threatened
Indian control of the region.10 Second, the anti-Soviet Afghan war offered a
model that Pakistan could use to exploit the insurgency.11 Third, Pakistani
leaders believed that, with the end of the Cold War, the world community
might be more willing to address the Kashmir issue than it had previously
been.12
Equally important as these factors, however, was Pakistan’s acquisition of a
nuclear capability, which enabled the Pakistanis to challenge territorial bound-
aries in Kashmir without fearing catastrophic Indian retaliation. Pakistani
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11. Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent, p. 104; and Husain Haqqani, “The Role of Islam in Pakistan’s Fu-
ture,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 28, No. 1 (Winter 2004/05), p. 90.
12. Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent, pp. 104–105.
leaders have openly acknowledged nuclear weapons’ emboldening effects.
Benazir Bhutto, who served her ªrst term as Pakistani prime minister from
1988 to 1990, stated, “I doubt that the nuclear capability was [originally] done
for Kashmir-speciªc purposes.” She admitted, however, that nuclear weapons
quickly “came out” as an important tool in that struggle. “The Kashmiris were
determined to win their freedom,” and the Pakistani government realized that
it could now provide extensive support for “a low-scale insurgency” in
Kashmir while insulated from a full-scale Indian response. “Islamabad saw its
capability as a deterrence to any future war with India,” Bhutto asserted, be-
cause “a conventional war could turn nuclear.” Thus even in the face of sub-
stantial Pakistani support for the Kashmir uprising, “India could not have
launched a conventional war, because if it did, it would have meant suicide.”13
Leading Pakistani strategic analysts agree. According to Shireen Mazari of
the Institute of Strategic Studies, with nuclear deterrence “each side knows it
cannot cross a particular threshold.” Thus “limited warfare in Kashmir be-
comes a viable option.”14 Even proliferation optimists admit that an emerging
nuclear capacity enabled the Pakistanis to adopt a more activist Kashmir poli-
cy. Ganguly, for example, acknowledges that one of the “compelling reasons”
that “emboldened the Pakistani military to aid the insurgency in Kashmir” in
the late 1980s was that “they believed that their incipient nuclear capabilities
had effectively neutralized whatever conventional military advantages India
possessed.”15
The Kargil operation was originally conceived in this strategic context.
Benazir Bhutto claimed that the army presented her with a Kargil-like plan in
1989 and 1996. According to Bhutto, the operation was designed to oust Indian
forces from Siachen Glacier in northern Kashmir.16 The army formulated a
plan in which Pakistani and Kashmiri forces would occupy the mountain
peaks overlooking the Kargil region. The logic was that “if we scrambled up
high enough . . . we could force India to withdraw” by severing its supply
lines to Siachen. “To dislodge us,” Bhutto recalled, the Indians “would have to
resort to conventional war. However, our nuclear capability [gave] the military
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14. Shireen M. Mazari, interview by author, Islamabad, Pakistan, April 2004; and Shireen M.
Mazari, “Kashmir: Looking for Viable Options,” Defence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 2 (February–March
1999), http://defencejournal.com/feb-mar99/kashmir-viable.htm.
15. Sumit Ganguly, Conºict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947 (New York: Columbia Uni-
versity Press, 2001), p. 92.
16. See V.R. Raghavan, Siachen: Conºict without End (New Delhi: Viking, 2002).
conªdence that India cannot wage a conventional war against Pakistan.”
Bhutto claimed that she rejected the proposal because even if it succeeded mili-
tarily, Pakistan lacked the political and diplomatic resources to achieve
broader strategic success.17
Like these early plans, Pakistan’s actual Kargil operation was designed pri-
marily to threaten India’s position in Siachen Glacier. According to Pakistani
President Pervez Musharraf, “Kargil was fundamentally about Kashmir,”
where the Indians occupy Pakistani territory, “for example at Siachen.” “Emo-
tions run very high here” on this issue. “Siachen is barren wasteland, but it be-
longs to us,” he asserted.18 Jalil Jilani, former director-general for South Asia in
Pakistan’s ministry of foreign affairs, described Siachen as “perhaps the most
important factor” underlying the Kargil operation. “Without Siachen,” he
argued, “Kargil would not have taken place.”19
Like the earlier plans, the Kargil operation was facilitated by Pakistan’s nu-
clear capacity. Jilani explained that the nuclear tests increased Pakistani lead-
ers’ willingness to challenge India in Kashmir. In the absence of a clear
Pakistani nuclear capacity, Jilani argues, “India wouldn’t be restrained” in re-
sponding to such provocations. An overt Pakistani nuclear capability, how-
ever, “brought about deterrence,” ensuring that there would be “no major
war” between India and Pakistan. In addition, conºict between two openly
nuclear states would attract international attention, encouraging outside dip-
lomatic intervention in Kashmir. Thus, as Jilani explained, nuclear weapons
played a dual role in Pakistani strategy at Kargil. They “deterred India” from
all-out conventional retaliation against Pakistan. And they sent a message to
the outside world regarding the seriousness of the Kashmir dispute: “War be-
tween nuclear powers is not a picnic. It’s a very serious business. One little
incident in Kashmir could undermine everything.”20
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19. Jalil Jilani, interview by author, Islamabad, Pakistan, April 2004. Unlike Musharraf, Jilani con-
ceded that Pakistan Army troops had launched the Kargil incursions.
20. Ibid. Pakistan’s nuclear capacity was not the only factor that emboldened its leaders to under-
take the Kargil operation. The Pakistanis believed that retaking the Kargil heights would be pro-
hibitively difªcult for India. And they hoped that the international community would accept the
Kargil operation, given Pakistan’s perilous position vis-à-vis a conventionally powerful, newly
nuclear India. On Pakistani tactical considerations, see Sardar F.S. Lodi, “India’s Kargil Opera-
tions: An Analysis,” Defence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 10 (November 1999), pp. 2–3; Shireen M. Mazari,
“Re-examining Kargil,” Defence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 11 (June 2000), pp. 44–46; Javed Nasir, “Calling
Pakistani analysts also note the emboldening impact of an overt nuclear ca-
pability on Pakistan’s behavior in Kashmir. Mazari argues that “open testing
makes a big difference in the robustness of deterrence,” further encouraging
the outbreak of limited warfare. She states, “While this scenario was prevalent
even when there was only a covert nuclear deterrence . . . overt nuclear capa-
bilities . . . further accentuated this situation.”21 Proliferation optimists concede
that these effects played a central role in facilitating the Kargil operation. In-
deed, Ganguly and Hagerty note that “absent nuclear weapons, Pakistan prob-
ably would not have undertaken the Kargil misadventure in the ªrst place.”22
Pakistani political leaders and strategic analysts, as well as optimistic South
Asian security scholars, thus recognize nuclear weapons’ emboldening impact
on the Pakistanis’ behavior in Kashmir and at Kargil. How, then, do scholars
make an optimistic case for nuclear weapons’ role in the Kargil conºict? Opti-
mists argue that although nuclear weapons facilitated Kargil’s outbreak, they
also deterred India from crossing the LoC during the ªghting, thereby ensur-
ing that the dispute was resolved without resort to full-scale war.23 Although it
is true that Indian leaders’ refusal to cross the Line of Control prevented esca-
lation of the Kargil conºict, the best available evidence indicates that Indian
policy was not driven primarily by a fear of Pakistani nuclear weapons.
V.P. Malik, Indian Army chief of staff during the Kargil operation, explains
that the Indians avoided crossing the Line of Control mainly out of concern for
world opinion: “The political leaders felt that India needed to make its case
and get international support” for its position in the conºict. The Indian gov-
ernment believed that it could best do so by exercising restraint even in the
face of clear Pakistani provocations.24 G. Parthasarathy, India’s high commis-
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ber 1999), pp. 8–11; Ayaz Ahmed Khan, “Indian Offensive in the Kargil Sector,” Defence Journal,
Vol. 3, No. 5 (June 1999), pp. 7–8; and Shaukat Qadir, “An Analysis of the Kargil Conºict, 1999,”
Royal United Service Institution Journal, Vol. 147, No. 2 (April 2002), pp. 2–3. On international opin-
ion, see Ganguly, Conºict Unending, p. 122; Ashley J. Tellis, C. Christine Fair, and Jamison Jo
Medby, Limited Conºicts under the Nuclear Umbrella: Indian and Pakistani Lessons from the Kargil Crisis
(Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 2001), p. 38; Mirza Aslam Beg, “Deterrence, Defence, and Develop-
ment,” Defence Journal, Vol. 3, No. 6 (July 1999), pp. 4–6; and Ejaz Haider, Friday Times editor, inter-
view by author, Lahore, Pakistan, April 2004.
21. Mazari, interview by author; Mazari, “Kashmir: Looking for Viable Options,” p. 64; and
Shireen M. Mazari, “Low-Intensity Conºicts: The New War in South Asia,” Defence Journal, Vol. 3,
No. 6 (July 1999), p. 41.
22. Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, p. 191.
23. Rajesh M. Basrur, Minimum Deterrence and India’s Nuclear Security (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford
University Press, 2006), pp. 73–74; and Ganguly and Hagerty, Fearful Symmetry, pp. 160–162.
24. V.P. Malik, interview by author, New Delhi, India, April 2004. On India’s battle for interna-
sioner to Pakistan during the Kargil conºict, agrees. Indian leaders refrained
from crossing the LoC, he explains, because they believed that doing so would
yield “political gains with the world community.” “We had to get the world to
accept that this was Pakistan’s fault,” he maintains. Staying on its side of the
LoC enabled India to “keep the moral high ground.”25
Despite these concerns, Indian leaders would probably have allowed the
military to cross the Line of Control if doing so had proved necessary. Accord-
ing to Malik, the civilian leadership’s “overriding political goal . . . was to eject
the intruders.” The government thus made clear that it would revisit its policy
if India’s military leaders ever felt the need to cross the LoC. This did not occur
because the Indians quickly began winning at Kargil, and by early June
were conªdent of victory. Malik maintains, however, that “if the tactical situa-
tion had not gone well, India would have crossed the LoC,” regardless of
Pakistan’s nuclear capacity. Pakistan had just shown that attacks across the
Line of Control need not trigger nuclear escalation. Thus the Indians believed
that Kargil could also be “done the other way.”26
Former Indian National Security Adviser Brajesh Mishra offers a similar
analysis: “The army never pushed the government to cross the LoC.” “If the
army had wanted,” he argues, “the government would have considered cross-
ing.” Mishra maintains that Pakistan’s nuclear capacity would not have de-
terred the cabinet from granting the army’s request, because Pakistan would
have been unlikely to use nuclear weapons in that scenario. “Pakistan can be
ªnished by a few bombs,” Mishra argues. “Anyone with a small degree of san-
ity,” he asserts, “would know that [nuclear war] would have disastrous conse-
quences for Pakistan.”27
Former Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes supports these claims.
According to Fernandes, India did not need to violate the Line of Control.
Once the Indian counteroffensive got under way, the government was con-
vinced that “India was in control” and “did not believe that the tactical situa-
tion was going to deteriorate.” Simultaneously, the Pakistanis were suffering
an international backlash, with “the United States . . . pressuring Pakistan” to
undo the Kargil incursions.28
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28. George Fernandes, interview by author, New Delhi, India, August 2004.
Former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee concurs with these assessments.
“There was no need to cross the LoC,” he explains, “because militarily India
was successful. But nothing was ruled out. If ground realities had required
military operations beyond the LoC, we would have seriously considered it.
We never thought atomic weapons would be used, even if we had decided to
cross the LoC.”29
Tactical and diplomatic calculations, then, rather than Pakistani nuclear
weapons, were primarily responsible for the Indian refusal to cross the LoC
during the Kargil conºict. This does not mean that Pakistan’s nuclear capacity
was entirely irrelevant to India’s decisionmaking. Malik concedes that
Pakistani nuclear weapons led the Indians to rule out full-scale conventional
war with Pakistan. As he explains, however, nuclear weapons were “not deci-
sive” in India’s refusal to violate the LoC, because the Indians did not believe
that crossing the line would trigger nuclear escalation.30 Nuclear weapons thus
did have a stabilizing effect on the conduct of the Kargil conºict, but one must
not exaggerate their impact. The danger of a Pakistani nuclear response would
have prevented India from deliberately launching a full-scale war against
Pakistan. Pakistani nuclear deterrence, however, did not prevent India from
violating the Line of Control. Indian leaders’ decision against crossing the
LoC turned mainly on nonnuclear considerations.31 And, as noted above,
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons facilitated the outbreak of the Kargil conºict in the
ªrst place.
Although India and Pakistan managed to avoid a nuclear or an all-out con-
ventional confrontation at Kargil, such an outcome was hardly a foregone
conclusion. Had the Indians not prevailed from behind the LoC, they probably
would have crossed the line and escalated the conºict. It is impossible to know
where such actions would have led. Although the Indians would not have de-
liberately threatened Pakistan with catastrophic defeat, the Pakistanis could
have perceived rapid Indian conventional gains as an existential threat, partic-
ularly if they endangered Pakistan’s nuclear command and control capabili-
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ties. The Pakistanis could have responded with a large-scale conventional or
even a nuclear attack.32 Kargil’s relatively restrained outcome thus belies the
conºict’s considerable danger.
During the 1998 to 2002 period, South Asia not only experienced its ªrst
war in twenty-eight years; between December 2001 and October 2002, it also
experienced the largest-ever Indo-Pakistani militarized standoff. The stand-
off’s size made its potential consequences even greater than those of the
Kargil conºict. Because the crisis did not escalate to the level of combat, prolif-
eration optimists argue that it demonstrates the stabilizing effects of nuclear
weapons on the subcontinent. A close examination, however, reveals that nu-
clear weapons had much the same effect on the 2001–02 crisis that they did on
Kargil; they helped to facilitate the confrontation and played only a limited
role in resolving it.
The 2001–02 crisis occurred in two phases. The ªrst phase began on
December 13, 2001, when militants attacked the Indian parliament while it was
in session. No members were killed, although several security personnel died
in a gun battle with the terrorists. The Indian government determined that two
Pakistan-backed militant groups, Lashkar-e-Taiba, and Jaish-e-Mohammed,
had carried out the assault. In response, India launched Operation Parakram,
mobilizing 500,000 troops along the Line of Control and the international bor-
der. The Indians simultaneously demanded that Pakistan surrender twenty
criminals believed to be located in Pakistan, renounce terrorism, shut down
terrorist training camps in Pakistani territory, and stanch the ºow of militant
inªltration into Jammu and Kashmir. If Pakistan did not comply, the Indians
planned to strike terrorist training camps and seize territory in Pakistani
Kashmir. Pakistan responded with large-scale deployments of its own, and
soon roughly 1 million troops were facing each other across the LoC and inter-
national border.33
In January 2002 President Musharraf took two important steps toward de-
International Security 33:2 80
32. See S. Paul Kapur, “Nuclear Proliferation, the Kargil Conºict, and South Asian Security,” Secu-
rity Studies, Vol. 13, No. 1 (Autumn 2003), p. 99. Lt. Gen. Khalid Kidwai, director of the Pakistan
Army’s Strategic Plans Division, speciªed loss of “a large part of [Pakistani] territory” as grounds
for the use of nuclear weapons. See Paolo Cotta-Ramusino and Maurizio Martellini, “Nuclear
Safety, Nuclear Stability, and Nuclear Strategy in Pakistan,” Laundau Network, http://
www.mi.infn.it/~landnet/Doc/pakistan.pdf (updated February 11, 2002).
33. For detailed discussions of the 2001–02 crisis, see V.K. Sood and Pravin Sawhney, Operation
Parakram: The War Unªnished (New Delhi: Sage, 2003); Polly Nayak and Michael Krepon, “U.S. Cri-
sis Management in South Asia’s Twin Peaks Crisis,” Report No. 57 (Washington, D.C.: Henry L.
Stimson Center, September 2006); and Sumit Ganguly and Michael R. Kraig, “The 2001–2002 Indo-
Pakistani Crisis: Exposing the Limits of Coercive Diplomacy,” Security Studies, Vol. 14, No. 2 (Sum-
mer 2005).
escalating the initial phase of the crisis. First, he outlawed Lashkar-e-Taiba and
Jaish-e-Mohammed. Then, in a nationally televised speech on January 12, he
pledged to prevent Pakistani territory from being used to foment terrorism in
Kashmir. U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, visiting New Delhi after stop-
ping in Islamabad, subsequently assured Indian leaders that Musharraf was
working to reduce terrorism, and was actively contemplating the extradition
of non-Pakistani suspects on India’s list of twenty fugitives.34 The evident suc-
cess of India’s coercive diplomacy, as well as a loss of strategic surprise and the
resulting fear of high casualties, led the Indians not to attack Pakistan in
January 2002.35 Indian forces, however, remained deployed along the LoC and
international border.
The second phase of the 2001–02 crisis erupted on May 14, 2002, when ter-
rorists killed thirty-two people at an Indian Army camp at Kaluchak in
Jammu.36 Outraged Indian leaders formulated a military response consider-
ably more ambitious than the plans adopted in January. Now, rather than sim-
ply attacking across the LoC, the Indians planned to drive three strike corps
from Rajasthan into Pakistan, engaging and destroying Pakistani forces and
seizing territory in the Thar Desert. Before the Indians could act, however, the
United States once again intervened. In early June, U.S. Deputy Secretary of
State Richard Armitage extracted a promise from President Musharraf not just
to reduce militant inªltration into Indian Kashmir, but to end inªltration “per-
manently.”37 Armitage conveyed Musharraf’s pledge to Indian ofªcials. Ac-
cording to Brajesh Mishara, Musharraf’s promise, U.S. assurances that
Musharraf would honor his commitment, and a notable decrease in terrorist
inªltration into Indian Kashmir led Indian leaders to conclude that “coercive
pressure was working.”38
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India ultimately did not strike Pakistan, and Indian forces began withdraw-
ing from the international border and LoC in October. Why did India demobi-
lize without attacking? It did so primarily because top ofªcials viewed the
Parakram deployment as having been successful. No further terrorism on the
scale of the parliament attack had occurred during the crisis. And the Indians
had secured a Pakistani pledge, backed by U.S. promises, to prevent such vio-
lence in the future. Vajpayee explains that “America gave us the assurance that
something will be done by Pakistan about cross-border terrorism. America
gave us a clear assurance. That was an important factor” in the Indian decision
to demobilize.39 Fernandes maintains that India had “no reason to attack.” The
Indians had “stayed mobilized to make the point that another [terrorist] attack
would result in an immediate response. No further attacks happened.”40 Ac-
cording to Mishra, Operation Parakram’s “national goal was to curb terrorism
emanating from Pakistan. That national goal . . . was achieved.”41 Additional
reasons for India’s failure to attack Pakistan in mid-2002 were the loss of the el-
ement of surprise; concern with the costs of a large-scale Indo-Pakistani
conºict, including the possibility of nuclear escalation; and a desire to avoid
angering the United States by attacking its key ally in the Afghan war.42
What role did nuclear weapons play in defusing the 2001–02 crisis? Prolifer-
ation optimists claim that the confrontation’s resolution was primarily the re-
sult of nuclear deterrence.43 The truth is more complicated than the optimists
suggest, however. Nuclear weapons did not play a major role in dissuading
Indian leaders from attacking Pakistan during the ªrst phase of the crisis in
January 2002. As noted above, Indian restraint resulted primarily from the be-
lief that India’s coercive diplomacy was succeeding against Pakistan, as well as
from concern that, in the absence of strategic surprise, the costs of a conven-
tional confrontation with Pakistan would be excessively high.
Pakistan’s nuclear capability did play a role in stabilizing the second phase
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of the crisis, in May and June 2002. The existence of Pakistan’s nuclear weap-
ons prevented the Indian government from planning an all-out attack against
Pakistan. As former Indian Army Vice Chief of Staff V.K. Sood explains, “India
could sever Punjab and Sindh with its conventional forces.” He goes on, how-
ever, “Pakistan would use nuclear weapons in that scenario.” The Indians
therefore sought “not to ªght for real estate,” but rather to “draw Pakistani
forces into battle . . . and inºict damage from which Pakistan would take a
long time to recover.”44 Thus Pakistan’s nuclear weapons did not prevent In-
dia from planning for a signiªcant attack against Pakistan proper, but they did
ensure that the attack’s projected scope would be limited, so as not to threaten
Pakistan with catastrophic defeat. In addition, the possibility of nuclear escala-
tion encouraged resolution of the dispute in June and the eventual demobiliza-
tion of Indian forces, though it was one of several factors contributing to this
outcome. As noted above, by exercising restraint the Indians also sought to
avoid antagonizing the United States, and incurring high costs in a conven-
tional conºict. And most important, Indian ofªcials believed that their coer-
cive diplomacy had been successful, and that large-scale military pressure on
Pakistan was no longer necessary. Thus nuclear weapons’ role in limiting the
2001–02 crisis is mixed. In one instance nuclear weapons had little effect, and
in another they did help to ameliorate the dispute, though they were not the
principal stabilizing factor.
In evaluating nuclear weapons’ impact on the 2001–02 crisis, however, one
must not overlook their role in fomenting the standoff. The Parakram confron-
tation resulted from India’s large-scale mobilization and associated coercive
diplomacy, which in turn was a reaction to an attack on the Indian parliament
and an Indian Army installation by Pakistan-backed Kashmiri terrorist
groups. The parliament and Kaluchak attacks were part of a broad pattern of
Pakistani low-intensity conºict, which, as explained earlier, was promoted by
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons capacity.45 Regardless of any stabilizing effects
that they may have had later in the 2001–02 dispute, then, nuclear weapons
played a central role in instigating the crisis.
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45. This is not to argue that Islamabad was directly involved in the parliament and Kaluchak op-
erations. My point, rather, is that Pakistan nurtured the militant groups behind these and other
anti-Indian attacks as part of its strategy of low-intensity conºict in Kashmir. This strategy, in turn,
was facilitated by Pakistani nuclear weapons, which insulated Pakistan from all-out Indian retalia-
tion and attracted international attention. Thus the 2001–02 attacks ªt a broad pattern of violence
stretching back to the late 1980s and were closely linked to Pakistan’s nuclear capacity.
Nuclear proliferation thus had a destabilizing effect on South Asia during
the period from 1998 to 2002. By encouraging provocative Pakistani behavior
and forceful Indian responses, nuclear weapons facilitated the outbreak of the
ªrst Indo-Pakistani war in twenty-eight years and the largest-ever South Asian
militarized standoff. And although nuclear deterrence did inject a measure of
caution into Indian decisionmaking, it was not critical to stabilizing either dis-
pute. Rather, the Kargil war and the 2001–02 crisis failed to escalate primarily
as the result of India’s concern with international opinion, faith in the success
of its coercive diplomacy, and conventional military limitations.
In the next section, I discuss the years 2002 to 2008. This period witnessed an
improvement in Indo-Pakistani relations, with a reduction in confrontations
and a warming of diplomatic relations between the two countries. Some com-
mentators attribute these developments in part to the pacifying effects of nu-
clear deterrence. I show, however, that security improvements during this
period were modest and that nuclear weapons were not responsible for them.
In fact, nuclear weapons triggered strategic developments that could destab-
ilize the subcontinent in the future.
Nuclear Weapons in South Asia, 2002 to 2008
Since the 2001–02 crisis, South Asia has not experienced a large-scale milita-
rized dispute; militant violence in Kashmir has declined; and India and
Pakistan have begun a peace dialogue to resolve the Kashmir dispute. Some
observers suggest that the pacifying effects of nuclear deterrence have facili-
tated these changes.46 Two facts must be kept in mind, however, when evaluat-
ing nuclear weapons’ role in the recent Indo-Pakistani rapprochement.
First, improvements in Indo-Pakistani relations, though real, have been
modest. To reduce tensions in the region, the two sides have adopted a series
of conªdence-building measures, such as a cross-LoC cease-ªre and the resto-
ration of transportation and trade links between Indian and Pakistani Kash-
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mir. 47 According to the Indian government, violence in Kashmir has declined;
terrorist-related incidents fell by 22 percent from 2004 to 2005, with civilian
deaths falling 21 percent and security personnel deaths falling 33 percent. In
2006, terrorist incidents declined an additional 16 percent, killing 30 percent
fewer civilians and 20 percent fewer security forces than during the previous
year. Despite this progress, the Kashmiri security situation remains tense. One
thousand six hundred sixty-seven terrorist incidents occurred in 2006, killing
540 civilians and security personnel. And estimated instances of militant inªl-
tration into Indian territory from Pakistani Kashmir declined only 4 percent
from 2005.48 As a result, hundreds of thousands of Indian security forces re-
main stationed in Kashmir. According to a senior Indian diplomat closely in-
volved with the Kashmir peace process, “It is difªcult to say” how much the
Indo-Pakistani security environment has improved. “The Kashmir evidence is
mixed,” he notes. “Cross-border [militant] trafªc reports are not very posi-
tive.” Meanwhile, the militants have shifted their geographical focus, and are
“now coming through Bangladesh with the help of Pakistani agencies. There
has been a change in tactics but not a change in attitude.”49 As Indian defense
analyst Raj Chengappa puts it, “We are not in a hair-trigger environment any-
more. But the situation is still serious.”50
Second, improvements in Indo-Pakistani relations have not resulted primar-
ily from nuclear deterrence. The Pakistanis reduced their support for anti-
Indian militancy for two main reasons. First, in the wake of the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, the U.S. government realized that Islamic terrorism was
a global problem with direct implications for the United States’ own security.
The Americans also decided that they needed Pakistan to serve as a leading
partner in their new antiterror coalition. Thus, although the United States had
previously turned a blind eye toward Pakistani support for militancy in South
Asia, it was no longer willing to do so. To serve as an ally in the U.S. antiter-
rorism effort—thereby avoiding the United States’ wrath and enjoying its
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ªnancial largesse—the Pakistanis were forced to reduce their support for
Islamic insurgents in Kashmir, in some cases going so far as to outlaw militant
groups.51 Second, Pakistani cooperation with the United States alienated
Islamic militant organizations, which branded Musharraf a traitor. These
groups subsequently turned against the Pakistani government and attempted
on multiple occasions to assassinate Musharraf.52 This led the government to
take further measures against the militants, as a matter of self-preservation.
Pakistan’s reduced support for anti-Indian militancy, then, is not the product
of nuclear deterrence. Rather, this policy shift resulted primarily from changes
in the international strategic environment after the September 11 terrorist
attacks.53
The Indians, for their part, have pursued improved relations with Pakistan
for two principal reasons, neither of which stems from nuclear deterrence.
First, India’s main national priority has become continued economic growth,
which Indian leaders believe is essential if the country is to reduce poverty,
shed its “third-world” status, and join the ªrst rank of nations.54 Greater pros-
perity, in turn, has led to rising economic aspirations among the Indian elec-
torate. Indians increasingly expect, as Chengappa puts it, “better jobs, the
American dream.” Therefore the government seeks “to focus on growth and to
keep the peace,” rather than squander resources on continued Indo-Pakistani
conºict.55 Second, recent anti-Indian terrorism, such as the 2005 Diwali bomb-
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ings in New Delhi and the 2006 train bombings in Mumbai, has been less pro-
vocative than previous attacks, such as the parliament assault.56 The Indians
therefore have opted for restraint despite ongoing violence. If a provocation on
the scale of the parliament attack were to occur, however, India might well
launch a major militarized response, regardless of Pakistan’s possession of nu-
clear weapons.57 Indeed, Indian leaders continue to believe, as they did during
the Kargil conºict and the 2001–02 crisis, that India could engage Pakistan in
large-scale conventional combat without starting a nuclear war. Like Pakistan,
then, India’s pursuit of improved Indo-Pakistani relations has not resulted
from nuclear deterrence. Rather, it is the product primarily of shifting domes-
tic priorities and nonnuclear strategic calculations.
Although the 2002–08 period has not seen terrorism on the scale of the par-
liament attack, Indian strategists, deeply affected by the Parakram experience,
are preparing for the possibility of such an occurrence. As I explain below,
these preparations may exacerbate regional security-dilemma dynamics, in-
creasing the likelihood of conºict. Thus not only have nuclear weapons had lit-
tle to do with the current Indo-Pakistani rapprochement; by facilitating past
disputes, nuclear weapons have unleashed strategic developments that may
destabilize South Asia well into the future.
Nuclear Weapons and Future Instability
As noted above, nuclear weapons facilitated provocative Pakistani behavior in
the wake of the 1998 tests, thereby triggering major Indo-Pakistani crises such
as the Kargil conºict and the 2001–02 standoff. Signiªcantly, the effect of these
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crises has not been limited to the past; they have had a profound effect on
current Indian strategic thinking, inspiring an aggressive shift in India’s con-
ventional military posture. This could increase the likelihood of serious Indo-
Pakistani conºict in years to come.
India has long enjoyed conventional military superiority over Pakistan.58
This advantage has been mitigated, however, by India’s peacetime deploy-
ment of offensive forces deep in the interior of the country, far from the Indo-
Pakistani border. As a result, Indian forces were slow to mobilize against the
Pakistanis, requiring several weeks before launching a large-scale offensive.59
This gave Pakistan time to prepare its defenses and ward off any impending
Indian attack. It also allowed the international community to bring diplomatic
pressure to bear on India’s civilian leadership, thereby preventing it from
launching military action.
Many Indian military leaders believe that this mobilization problem pre-
vented India from acting decisively during the 2001–02 crisis. By the time
Indian forces were prepared to move against Pakistan, the Pakistanis were able
to ready their defenses, making a potential Indian attack far more costly. Most
important, the Indians’ slowness enabled the United States to pressure the
Indian government, convincing it to abandon plans to strike Pakistan. Thus, in
the words of a prominent Indian defense writer, Operation Parakram demon-
strated that India’s “mobilization strategy was completely ºawed.”60 In addi-
tion, the government’s restraint caused rancor within the armed forces. Senior
ofªcers believed that civilian leaders misused the military, ordering it to un-
dertake a long and costly deployment and then opting for retreat, leaving the
Pakistanis unpunished. As a senior U.S. defense ofªcial stationed in New
Delhi puts it, Indian commanders “were frustrated. . . . They really wanted to
go after Pakistan but couldn’t.”61
To prevent a recurrence of Parakram’s failures, the Indians began to formu-
late a new “Cold Start” military doctrine, which will enable India to rapidly
International Security 33:2 88
58. See Anthony H. Cordesman, The India-Pakistan Military Balance (Washington, D.C.: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 2002); Ashley J. Tellis, Stability in South Asia (Santa Monica,
Calif.: RAND, 1997); and Kapur, Dangerous Deterrent, pp. 50–53.
59. Tellis, Stability in South Asia, pp. 20–21; and Gurmeet Kanwal, director, Center for Land War-
fare Studies, interview by author, New Delhi, India, December 2007.
60. Sundeep Unnithan, assistant editor of India Today, interview by author, New Delhi, India, De-
cember 2007.
61. Senior U.S. defense ofªcial, interview by author, U.S. embassy, New Delhi, India, December
2007. For critical analyses of Parakram, see, for example, Sood and Sawhney, Operation Parakram;
and Praveen Swami, “Beating the Retreat,” Frontline, Vol. 19, No. 22 (October 26–November 8,
2002), http://www.frontlineonnet.com/f11922/stories/20021108007101200.htm.
launch a large-scale attack against Pakistan. The doctrine will augment the of-
fensive capabilities of India’s traditionally defensive holding formations lo-
cated close to the Indo-Pakistani border. It also will eventually shift offensive
forces from their current locations in the Indian hinterland to bases closer to
Pakistan. Within 72 to 96 hours of a mobilization order, Cold Start would send
three to ªve division-sized integrated battle groups (IBGs) consisting of armor,
mechanized infantry, and artillery roughly 20–80 kilometers into Pakistan
along the breadth of the Indo-Pakistani border. The IBGs would aggressively
engage Pakistani forces and seize a long, shallow swath of Pakistani territory.
Cold Start seeks to achieve three goals: to inºict signiªcant attrition on enemy
forces; to retain Pakistani territory for use as a postconºict bargaining chip;
and, by limiting the depth of Indian incursions, to avoid triggering a Pakistani
strategic nuclear response. Indian military planners hope that these doctrinal
changes, coupled with India’s growing conventional military capabilities,62
will result in a more nimble force that is able to prevent a repetition of Opera-
tion Parakram’s shortcomings.63
Cold Start is currently in its nascent stages.64 The doctrine’s continued
development and implementation, however, will likely have two major ef-
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fects. First, it will probably exacerbate regional security-dilemma dynamics.
Pakistan has always been a deeply insecure state, militarily outmatched by
India, lacking strategic depth, and suffering from domestic instability. The
Pakistanis could previously expect India’s lengthy mobilization schedule to
mitigate its military advantages. In the future, however, this may not be the
case. As a result, Pakistan will have to maintain a higher state of readiness,65
and will face incentives to offset Indian strategic advances through increased
arms racing and asymmetric warfare. Such behavior could trigger aggressive
Indian responses, which would further heighten Pakistani insecurity. These
dynamics could undermine recent improvements in Indo-Pakistani relations
and increase the probability of crises between the two countries.
Second, Indian doctrinal changes increase the likelihood that Indo-Pakistani
crises will escalate rapidly, both within the conventional sphere and from the
conventional to the nuclear level. In the conventional realm, Cold Start will en-
able Indian forces to attack Pakistan quickly, pushing an Indo-Pakistani dis-
pute from the level of political crisis to outright conºict before the Indian
government can be deterred from launching an offensive. Vijay Oberoi ex-
plains that the decision to attack Pakistan would require “a certain amount of
political will. But [Cold Start] makes that political will more likely to be there,
since now we can mobilize before world opinion comes down on political
leaders and prevents them from acting.”66
In the nuclear realm, India’s Cold Start doctrine would likely force Pakistan
to rely more heavily on its strategic deterrent. Brig. Gen. Khawar Hanif,
Pakistan’s defense attaché to the United States, argues that Cold Start will cre-
ate a “greater justiªcation for Pakistani nuclear weapons” and may increase
the danger of nuclear use. “The wider the conventional asymmetry,” he main-
tains, “the lower the nuclear threshold between India and Pakistan. To the
extent that India widens the conventional asymmetry through military spend-
ing and aggressive doctrinal changes, the nuclear threshold will get lower.”
Maj. Gen. Muhammad Mustafa Khan, director-general (analysis) of Pakistan’s
Inter-Services Intelligence agency, similarly argues that Cold Start “is destabil-
izing; it is meant to circumvent nuclear deterrence and warning time,” and “it
is entirely Pakistan-speciªc.” “This will force us to undertake countermea-
sures,” he continues, “and if it becomes too threatening we will have to rely on
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our nuclear capability.”67 Thus Cold Start may erode the ªrebreak between
conventional and nuclear conºict on the subcontinent.
The Indians reportedly anticipate such an outcome at the tactical level and
are preparing to ªght through Pakistani battleªeld nuclear strikes.68 Indian
strategists dismiss the possibility of a Pakistani nuclear response against India
proper, however. Rather, they maintain that India can calibrate its attack,
stopping short of Pakistan’s strategic nuclear thresholds and waiting for inter-
national diplomatic intervention to end the conºict. As Gurmeet Kanwal ex-
plains, “We war-game this all the time, and we do not trip their [strategic] red
lines.” According to Arun Sahgal, Cold Start “will give Pakistan no option but
to bring down its nuclear thresholds. But this shouldn’t really worry us. We
don’t think Pakistan will cross the nuclear Rubicon.”69
Given the uncertainties that would be inherent in a large-scale Indo-
Pakistani conºict, however, such a benign outcome is not guaranteed. For ex-
ample, an unexpectedly rapid and extensive Indian victory, or failure to
achieve a quick diplomatic resolution to the conºict, could result in a far more
extreme Pakistani response than the Indians currently anticipate. Thus India’s
planning for a carefully controlled limited war with Pakistan could prove to be
overly optimistic. As a senior U.S. defense ofªcial familiar with Cold Start
worries, the Indians “think that they can ªght three or four days, and the inter-
national community will stop it. And they believe that they can ªght through a
nuclear exchange. But there are unintended consequences. Calibrate a conven-
tional war and nuclear exchange with Pakistan? It doesn’t work that way.”70
Signiªcantly, a large-scale Indo-Pakistani crisis could erupt even without a
deliberate decision by the Pakistani government to provoke India. The Islamist
forces that the Pakistanis have nurtured in recent decades have taken on a life
of their own and do not always act at Islamabad’s behest. Indeed, they often
behave in ways inimical to Pakistani interests, such as launching attacks on
Pakistani security forces, government ofªcials, and political ªgures.71 If these
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entities were to stage an operation similar to the 2001 parliament attack, India
could hold the Pakistani government responsible, whether or not Islamabad
was behind the operation.72 And with a doctrine that would enable rapid mo-
bilization, India’s military response could be far more extensive, and more
dangerous, than it was during the 2001–02 crisis.
By facilitating the outbreak of serious Indo-Pakistani crises in the past, then,
nuclear weapons have inspired strategic developments that will make the out-
break and rapid escalation of regional crises more likely in the future. Thus nu-
clear weapons proliferation not only destabilized South Asia in the ªrst decade
since the 1998 tests; proliferation is also likely to increase dangers on the sub-
continent in years to come.
Conclusion
In the ªrst decade after the Indo-Pakistani nuclear tests, South Asia managed
to avoid a nuclear or full-scale conventional war. This does not mean, how-
ever, that nuclear proliferation has stabilized the region. In fact, nuclear weap-
ons have played an important role in destabilizing the subcontinent. Nuclear
proliferation encouraged the outbreak of the ªrst Indo-Pakistani war in
twenty-eight years as well as the eruption of South Asia’s largest-ever milita-
rized standoff, and played only a minor role in these crises’ resolution. It has
little to do with the current thaw in Indo-Pakistani relations. And it has trig-
gered strategic developments that could threaten the region’s stability well
into the future.
Although I have argued in this article against the claims of proliferation op-
timists, my ªndings suggest that both optimistic and pessimistic scholars
largely ignore one of nuclear weapons proliferation’s most pressing dangers.
Proliferation optimists downplay proliferation risks by maintaining that the
leaders of new nuclear states are neither irrational nor suicidal. Therefore,
these scholars argue, new nuclear states will behave responsibly, avoiding
overly provocative actions for fear of triggering a devastating response.73 Pes-
simists, by contrast, emphasize problems such as organizational pathologies,
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arguing that these factors will result in suboptimal decisionmaking and dan-
gerous behavior by new nuclear states.74
The decade since the South Asian nuclear tests, however, suggests that a
principal risk of nuclear proliferation is not that the leaders of new nuclear
states will be irrational or suicidal, or even that organizational and other pa-
thologies will result in suboptimal policy formulation. The danger, rather, is
that leaders may weigh their strategic options and reasonably conclude that
risky behavior best serves their interests. Nuclear weapons do enable Pakistan,
as a conventionally weak, dissatisªed power, to challenge the territorial status
quo with less fear of an all-out Indian military response. Ensuing crises do at-
tract international attention potentially useful to the Pakistanis’ cause. And
forceful retaliation does enable India to defeat speciªc Pakistani challenges,
while offering it a possible means of deterring future Pakistani adventurism.
Thus, given their military capabilities and territorial preferences, India’s and
Pakistan’s recent behavior has not been unreasonable. But even if these poli-
cies make sense from the two countries’ own strategic perspectives, they are
nonetheless dangerous, creating a signiªcant risk of catastrophic escalation.
Thus nuclear proliferation could have dire consequences even if new nuclear
states behave in a largely rational manner.
This ªnding has implications not just in South Asia but also beyond the re-
gion, including for potential proliferators such as Iran. According to the opti-
mists’ logic, because the Iranians are neither irrational nor bent on suicide, the
international community should not be inordinately fearful of an Iranian nu-
clear capability. One need not believe that Iranian leaders seek their own coun-
try’s destruction, however, to worry that Iran’s acquisition of nuclear weapons
could pose signiªcant dangers. If the Iranians decided to use their nuclear ca-
pability in a manner similar to the Pakistanis, they could increase their support
for terrorism, or even engage in outright conventional aggression, to challenge
objectionable territorial or political arrangements while insulated from large-
scale U.S. or Israeli retaliation. Such behavior would not be irrational if a state
were committed to destabilizing its adversaries, extending its inºuence, and
undermining the territorial status quo. But it would be extremely dangerous
and detrimental to the interests of the international community.75
Nuclear optimists such as Barry Posen, “judging from cold war history,” ar-
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gue that “while it’s possible that Iranian leaders would think this way, it’s
equally possible that they would be more cautious.” Thus, they conclude, the
world “can live with a nuclear Iran.”76 Judging from the vantage point of re-
cent South Asian history, however, the situation could be considerably more
dangerous than optimistic scholars suggest. If the Iranians assess their strate-
gic interests in a manner similar to the Pakistanis, they are unlikely to behave
cautiously upon acquiring nuclear weapons. Instead they will adopt risky pol-
icies that have destabilizing effects similar to those in South Asia. As I have ar-
gued, although India and Pakistan have so far managed to resolve resulting
crises without catastrophe, this outcome has in no way been guaranteed. Nor,
unfortunately, will benign outcomes be guaranteed in future confrontations—
either in South Asia or among newly nuclear states elsewhere in the world.
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